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Article
Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute
Settlement: The Outstanding Question of
the Legality of Local Working
Requirements+
Bryan Mercurio* and Mitali Tyagi**
ABSTRACT
This Article explores treaty interpretation in dispute
settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO) by seeking
to resolve the unanswered question of whether local working
requirements—domestic provisions which allow the grant of a
compulsory license when a patent is not “worked” in that
country—are legal under the international trade regime. The
issue remains in flux as local working requirements appear to
be inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
International Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 27, which
prohibits discrimination as to “whether products are imported or
locally produced.” However, TRIPS Article 2.2 incorporates the
substantial majority of the Paris Convention, including Article
5(A)(2), which may specifically allow working requirements.
Analyzing the issue in strict adherence to the principles of
treaty interpretation that guide decision-making in the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body, we conclude that the incorporation of
Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention cannot be read down, and
+ The opinions in this paper belong solely to the authors and do not represent the
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comments and suggestions. All errors belong solely to the authors.
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275

276

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

thus working requirements are consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement. This Article is therefore intentionally and
unapologetically a technical analysis which evaluates and
resolves a legal conflict using all available sources of law and is
not a discussion of the policy rationale behind local working
requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The completion of the GATT Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations transformed the international trading regime.1 The
agreement,2 signed as a single undertaking by a large and
diverse membership, created the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and required the acceptance, in one sweep, of a complex
maze of obligations aimed at liberalizing global trade.3
In what has since been termed the “Grand Bargain,”
proponents of including intellectual property rights into the
international trading regime (most notably the United States,
the European Community (EC), Switzerland, and Canada)
traded access to their potentially lucrative textile and
agricultural markets in exchange for increased intellectual
property protection.4 The resulting negotiations culminated in
1. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003) (providing an in-depth examination of the negotiations);
4 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1994) (Terence P.

Stewart ed., 1999) (providing an in-depth examination of the negotiations).
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
3. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 25, 25–26 (1998) (stating that the agreement required “some 30
multilateral international agreements with supplementary ‘Under-standings’,
‘Protocols’, ‘Ministerial Decisions’, ‘Declarations’ and more than 30,000 pages of
‘Schedules of Concessions’ for trade in goods and ‘Specific Commitments’ for trade in
services” and “numerous references to other international agreements and general
international law rules . . . and the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’”).
4. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 20 September 1986, 25 I.L.M.
1623, 1623 (1986) (detailing the framework for the negotiations); GATT Secretariat,
Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16 (Nov. 20,
1987) (laying out the European Community’s stance towards the negotiations);
GATT Secretariat, United States Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14 (Oct. 20, 1987) (stating the
United States’ stance towards the negotiations). See generally Jagdish Bhagwati,
Commentary, Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE NEW GATT:
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TRIPS.5 As a result, intellectual property now forms a part of an
international trading regime enforceable through recourse to
the “most formidable dispute settlement scheme of any
international Organization”6—the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). Administered by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB), the DSU provides the substantive and procedural
rules used to interpret and enforce as “hard law”7 the “global
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 111, 111–14 (Susan Collins & Barry
Bosworth eds., 1994); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96–120 (2003) (arguing that
twelve corporations were responsible for the changes arising from the negotiations);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004) (detailing
the provisions of the result of the negotiations); Wilfred J. Ethier, Intellectual
Property Rights and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 449, 454 (2004) (noting that countries agreed to protection of intellectual
property rights for trade concessions); Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in
an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
123 (2004) (discussing the “successful effort by the United States and European
Communities” to shift the intellectual property regime); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20–21 (2004) (stating why the United
States and the European Community pushed for GATT); David W. Leebron,
Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 12–13 (2002) (discussing the issue of strategic
negotiation of trade agreements); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries and the Doha “Solution” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 59 (2002)
(“[D]eveloping countries accepted the commitments of TRIPS because it was in their
mutual interest when coupled with the concessions that they received on other
issues.”).
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Although the World
Intellectual Property Organization-administered Paris and Berne Conventions
contemplated dispute settlement recourse to the International Court of Justice, such
recourse required the consent of both parties and was never utilized. One
commentator states: “The previously unenforceable Paris Convention was suddenly
given vitality because TRIPS incorporates by reference the key elements of the Paris
Convention.” Harold C. Wegner, Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, 4
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 170 (2006).
6. Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght, Introduction, in REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 11, 11 (Georgiev & Van
der Borght eds., 2006); James Bacchus, Appellators: The Quest for the Meaning of
And/Or, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 499, 501–03 (2005). For a discussion concerning the
strength of WTO dispute settlement, see generally THOMAS ZIMMERMANN,
NEGOTIATING THE REVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 59
(2006); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54
INT’L ORG. 385, 389 (2000); Petersmann, supra note 3, at 33–36; Arie Reich, From
Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 777 (1996–1997).
7. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401,
404, 406 (2000) (describing the WTO dispute settlement system with regard to the
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package deal” of agreements that make up the WTO.8
As with any diplomatic agreement, the WTO Agreements
are the result of compromise. It is therefore unsurprising that
divergent interests and “textual and operational flaws” remain.9
It should also not be surprising that the texts of international
agreements are purposely left ambiguous by the drafters.
Textual ambiguity allows the parties to reach agreement and
conclude negotiations without abandoning or compromising
their positions.10 It thus falls upon the DSB to elucidate the
meaning of provisions when a dispute arises. Such
interpretative power, in an era when the political wing
consistently fails to reach consensus and govern, provides the
DSB with a form of quasi-lawmaking power.11 Although an
adopted report of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body
technically only binds the parties to the dispute, it is
abundantly clear that reports of the DSB have immense
influence on the actions of the entire membership and the
subsequent decisions of WTO panels.12
concept of legalization); Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to
Essential Medicines Under the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OTTAWA L. REV. 191, 195
(2006–2007) (noting that the TRIPS agreement is a “shift from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law”).
8. Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann,
Constitutionalism
and
International
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 442 (1996–1997) (highlighting the
impact of the “global package deal” where parties, in one single stroke, accept
obligations in multiple sectors). The diversity of subject matter that comes with this
“global package deal” is particularly interesting in dispute settlement where the
mechanisms are now applicable to previously compartmentalized areas of
international cooperation, such as GATS and TRIPS. See id.
9. Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 218 (2004).
10. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 50 (2000)
(“WTO Member countries still have the option, within certain limits, of defining the
scope of patentability in quite a broad way . . . .”).
11. See Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO
Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 75 (2002) (discussing the elasticity that has
arisen from the ambiguity of the language of the WTO Agreements); Richard H
Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 258–59 (2004) (discussing the position
that the DSU should be allowed to “fill gaps and clarify ambiguities in almost all
circumstances”). For a discussion of the failure of the Doha Round of trade
negotiations, see Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8
MELB. J. INT’L L. 198, 200–06 (2008); Simon J. Evenett, Reciprocity and the Doha
Round Impasse: Lessons for the Near-Term and After, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES.,
Sept. 3, 2007, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PI.asp.
12. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 158, 160, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30,
2008) (“It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with
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This Article explores the treaty interpretation principles
that have guided, and will presumably continue to guide, the
decision-making of the WTO DSB. To give this analysis the
benefit of a practical and significant context, this Article focuses
on determining the legality of “local working requirements”
under the TRIPS Agreement. While this issue is highly
politicized and often couched in emotive arguments, it is our
belief that a resolution will best be achieved through the
adjudicative legal analysis of the WTO DSB. At the very least,
given the complete failure of the political wing of the WTO to
effectively resolve the dispute through legislation,13 recourse to
the DSU is the most effective available forum to seek resolution

respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does
not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and
the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been
adopted by the DSB. . . . Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO
Members attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate
Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in
support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon
by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when
enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international
trade matters, WTO members take into account the legal interpretation of the
covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus,
the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports
becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system.
Ensuring security and predictability in the dispute settlement system, as
contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an
adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a
subsequent case.”). See also Appellate Body Report, United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Malaysia, ¶¶ 108–09, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Appellate Body
Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 14, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). There is also a growing body of academic literature
suggesting that, at the very least, a de facto system of precedent has become an
integral part of WTO jurisprudence and perhaps even a source of law in itself. For a
three part examination of this issue, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis
and International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 936–41 (1999); Raj Bhala,
The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 141–46 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards
De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 957–
67 (2001); see also Anne Scully-Hill & Hans Mahncke, The Emergence of the Doctrine
of Stare Decisis in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 36
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 133, 141–45 (2009).
13. Although we do see encouraging signs of political will in the Doha Round,
there are two examples of consensus and progress among members. See Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of Paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/405
(Aug. 28, 2003); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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on a question of legality.
To that extent, the object of our study is similar to that
articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his famous
paper The Path of the Law:
People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will
run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this
danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts.14

This analysis differs considerably from the existing
literature, which mainly consists of normative, public policy
perspectives on the issue.15 In contrast, this Article is a
technical analysis which evaluates and resolves a legal conflict
using all available sources of law. Following a brief introduction
to the technicalities of local working requirements in
international intellectual property law, this Article discusses
whether this legal ambiguity can be characterized as a conflict
of norms in international trade law. This Article does not
consider the exceptions to rights conferred (Article 30) or
compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS (Article 31) to be the
platform on which a debate regarding local working
requirements should be conducted. Instead, the question is
whether the two seemingly conflicting treaty provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement are reconcilable. Their reconciliation is the

14. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920),
quoted in HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 166 (Anders Wedberg
trans., 2007) (1945).
15. Accordingly, this article will not rehash the well-documented desperation of
developing countries struggling to gain access to essential medicines or the possible
impact of intellectual property rights in that regard. Those issues have been
thoroughly discussed elsewhere. See generally Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping
over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the Manufacturing of Scarcity, 17
CONN. J. INT’L L. 157, 158–62 (2002) (discussing the struggle for access to medicine
within the context of South Africa); David P. Fidler, Neither Science nor Shamans:
Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 191, 194–96 (1999) (discussing the disparity in health conditions
between wealthy and poor nations); Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to
Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 104–07 (2003) (discussing the impact of a lack of
access to health care in developing countries); Mercurio, supra note 9, at 225–28
(describing the effect of the Doha Declaration on patent protection in developing
countries); Charles T. Collins-Chase, Comment, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus
Protection in Developing Countries Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763,
766–69 (2008) (describing the access problems related to antiretroviral HIV/AIDS
drugs in developing countries).
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basis for the legality of local working requirements. The Article
then introduces the tools of treaty interpretation necessary to
resolve the conflict, before considering the effect of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha
Declaration)16 on this issue. Finally, we provide legal analysis to
determine the legality of local working requirements under the
TRIPS Agreement. This Article is therefore intended to be an
exploration of treaty interpretation in WTO dispute settlement
with the aim of determining the legality of local working
requirements under the TRIPS Agreement.
II. LOCAL WORKING REQUIREMENTS
The traditional view of intellectual property rights is “as
instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges on
individuals solely for the purpose of contributing to the greater
public good. The privilege is therefore a means to an end, and
not an end in itself.”17 This privilege—in the form of a limited
period monopoly right to exploit the creation—must then come
with certain restrictions to ensure that the public interest is
adequately protected.18 Local working requirements came about
as a balancing mechanism between a monopoly right and its
impact on the public interest.
Local working requirements require the patent holder to
manufacture the patented product or apply the patented process
(i.e., “work” the patent) within the country granting the patent
rights in order to maintain its exclusive exploitive rights.19
Under the Paris Convention, a failure to work the patent is
deemed an abuse of the exclusive rights attached to the patent
and allows the government of the patent granting country to
issue a compulsory license for the patent to a local producer.20

16.
17.

Doha Declaration, supra note 13, ¶ 5.
COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, DEP’T OF INT’L DEV.,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 6 (2003), quoted
in Hans Morten Haugen, Intellectual Property—Rights or Privileges?, 8 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 445, 445 (2005).
18. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 36–65 (2000) (discussing the forms and limitations placed upon
various forms of intellectual property).
19. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 71 (1968).
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5, ¶ A(2),
Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention] (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take
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Thus, while the patent remains the property of the abusive
patent holder, the owner no longer has the exclusive right to
exploit the patent.21 Article 5 does, however, place limitations on
the granting of a compulsory license. For example, the patent
holder must have sufficient time to work the patent (defined in
Article 5(A)(4) as a period of four years from the date of filing of
the patent application or three years from the date of the grant
of the patent, whichever period expires last), and a compulsory
license will not be issued if the patent holder has legitimate
reasons for not working the patent.22
The 1886 Rome Conference of the Paris Convention left the
parameters of adequately working a patent—then referred to by
the official French term exploiter—undefined. Thus, each
country had the ability to tailor its laws to match its policies and
needs. Bodenhausen states the prevailing view of the 1967
revision to the Paris Convention:
The member states are also free to define what they understand by
“failure to work”. Normally, working a patent will be understood to
mean working it industrially, namely, by manufacture of the patented
product, or industrial application of a patented process. Thus,
importation or sale of the patented article, or of the article
manufactured by a patented process, will not normally be regarding as
“working” the patent.23

The use of the word “abuse” for non-working patent holders

legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent, for example, failure to work.”).
21. However, the Paris Convention also provides that forfeiture can be an
option where “the grant of compulsory licenses would not . . . [be] sufficient to
prevent the said abuses.” See id. art. 5, ¶ A(3). Compulsory licenses were introduced
relatively recently in the long history of local working requirements. In fact, when
the Paris Convention was first negotiated and drafted, forfeiture of the patent was
the only consequence for failing to work a patent. This drastic 19th century remedy
was moderated with the introduction of compulsory licenses to address abuse of
patents in the 1925 Hague Revision of the Paris Convention. See Paul Champ &
Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement:
An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2002);
Wegner, supra note 5, at 160.
22. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement adds to the Paris Convention by
requiring the provision of adequate remuneration to the patent holder in instances
where a compulsory license is granted over the patent. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS,
Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle
to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 33–34 (2002); Jennifer Bjornberg, Note, Brazil’s Recent
Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199,
203 (2006) (discussing the compulsory licensing requirements of Article 31).
23. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 19, at 71.
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hints at the traditional and economic significance attached to
this concept. As one commentator summarizes:
[The local working requirement] has the effect of forcing foreign
patentees to situate production facilities within the patent granting
country. Such transfers of technology are desirable from the patent
granting country’s point of view because they contribute to a variety of
public policy goals such as employment creation, industrial and
technological capacity building, national balance of payments, and
economic independence.24

Although not a contentious point, we note for posterity that
by reading the term “local” into working requirements we are
not proceeding based on an unfounded assumption. The
importance of technology transfer as a rationale for working
requirements25 necessitates working the patent locally.
Furthermore, the prevailing view, as articulated by
Bodenhausen above, allows state parties to determine the
burden that a working requirement places; however, that view
specifically excludes importation as a means of satisfying that
burden. In light of this, it is very difficult for us to envisage a
persuasive argument that working requirements are offended
by the term “local.”
In fact, contention regarding local working requirements
generally only became an issue after the creation of the TRIPS
Agreement. Until that point, local working requirements had
been part of international intellectual property law for well over
a century, but were rarely discussed. Not only did the TRIPS
Agreement call into question the legality of these
requirements,26 it did so at a time when issues of public health
24. Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working
Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 243, 246 (1997).
25. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, ¶ 5.46 (2d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf
(“The
main
argument for enforcing working of the invention in a particular country is the
consideration that, in order to promote the industrialization of the country, patents
for invention should not be used merely to block the working of the invention in the
country or to monopolize importation of the patented article by the patent owner.
They should rather be used to introduce the use of the new technology into the
country.”); see also INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 146 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. ed., 1997) (“The principal goal of
requiring local working of a patented invention is the transfer of technology, the
actual working of patented inventions in a given country being seen as the most
efficient way of accomplishing such a transfer to that country.”).
26. Unfortunately, most commentators and even Gervais’s acclaimed treatise
on TRIPS virtually ignore the negotiating and drafting history of this issue. See, e.g.,
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and access to medicines gained worldwide attention. Thus, at
almost the exact moment public health activists began to
recommend the use of local working requirements as a tool to
increase access to medicines in the developing world, the
legality of such measures were, for the first time, being
questioned.27 Local working requirements are highly relevant to
public health because the governments of developing countries
could potentially intervene if the patent holder refuses to work
the patent locally and allow generic production of essential
pharmaceuticals and/or importation in instances of scarcity or
prohibitively priced pharmaceuticals.
As noted in the introduction, this Article will not delve into
the issue of whether the link between intellectual property and
international trade law impeded developing country access to
pharmaceuticals or even whether local working requirements
should, for public policy reasons, be deemed TRIPS compliant.28
This study is more contained: we simply provide legal analysis
on the issue of whether local working requirements as they
relate to local production are compliant with the TRIPS
Agreement.29
This issue was the subject of a WTO complaint in 2001
when the United States filed a complaint against Brazil for
enforcing local working requirements in its national laws.30 The
two countries reached a mutually agreeable solution to the
dispute, which left the question of the legality of local working

Gervais, supra note 1, at 222. Others curtly dismiss the possibility that Article 27 of
the TRIPS Agreement impacts upon working requirements. See, e.g., THIAMANGA
KONGOLO, UNSETTLED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTURAL PROPERTY ISSUES 6 (2008)
(“[U]nder TRIPS, ‘working’ has an extensive meaning to include the import of
patented products.”).
27. Sol Picciotto, Private Rights vs. Public Interests in the TRIPS Agreement:
The Access to Medicines Dispute, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC 167, 169 (2003).
28. See generally supra text accompanying note 15.
29. The scope of this article is therefore limited to non-local working as per
local production as opposed to non-working of a patent as such. The issue is not
merely academic, and the likelihood of ultimate resolution by the DSB remains high.
Correa states: “The interpretation of this clause is debatable. Though Article 27.1
has been understood as prohibiting any obligation to execute a patented invention
locally, this interpretation is not unanimous. . . . The interpretation of this Article is
likely to be finally settled under WTO procedures.” Carlos M. Correa, Procompetitive Measures Under TRIPS to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing
Countries, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49 (Peter Drahos & Ruth
Mayne eds., 2002).
30. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
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requirements unanswered.31 In addition, it left developing
countries and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers in a
perpetual state of uneasiness about whether taking advantage
of legally uncertain options to provide greater access to essential
medicines will eventually be challenged.32
Before discussing the United States’ complaint against
Brazil regarding the legality of local working requirements, we
introduce the legal framework of the dispute.
III. THE PROBLEM
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK—MEET THE PLAYERS
As outlined above, Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention
explicitly grants a right allowing the use of local working
requirements:
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.

Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention is therefore the
starting point in outlining the legal provisions that frame any
discussion on the legality of working requirements. Article
5(A)(2) remains relevant to the issue as Article 2 of TRIPS
imports the obligations that bind members under the Paris
Convention.33 In particular, Article 2.2 of TRIPS imposes the

31. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001).
32. See Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing
Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st
Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 212 (2002) (“Despite the AIDS epidemic
in South Africa, the country has neither characterized the health crisis as a national
emergency nor requested a compulsory license to produce generic copies of necessary
medications to treat HIV/AIDS . . . because it feared the imposition of sanctions by
the United States and other Western trading partners.”) (citations omitted).
33. Absent any articulated intention from the drafters that the incorporation of
the WIPO treaties, such as the Paris Convention, into the WTO TRIPS Agreement is
“a dynamic one”, we agree with the academic thought on this point and proceed on
the basis that the WIPO treaties were incorporated as they stood at the date of the
TRIPS Agreement in 1994. See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 265 (2002); see also Suzy Frankel, WTO Application of the “Customary Rules on
Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
365, 408 (2005–2006) (noting that TRIPS members are subject to the obligations of
the agreements incorporated into the treaty).

286

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

Paris Convention provisions on TRIPS rules relating to patents:
“Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement [i.e., including Part
II(5) – Patents] shall derogate from existing obligations that
members may have to each other under the Paris Convention,
the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”34
The incorporation of the earlier treaties administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) into the
TRIPS Agreement demonstrates that it is meant to build upon,
rather than replace, the earlier conventions. However, the
incorporation of the Paris Convention is complicated by Article
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires members to
ensure that, “patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention,
the field of technology and whether products are imported or
locally produced.”35
On its face, Article 27(1) appears to prohibit the use of local
working requirements. This is the case for several reasons.
First, it is unquestionable that local working requirements could
detrimentally impact the patent holder’s enjoyment of patent
rights based on the location of production. Simply stated, while
local production of a product would satisfy the local working
requirement, overseas production would violate it and may
attract the imposition of a compulsory license. Second, the
obligations in Article 27(1) are made subject to provisions such
as Articles 65(4) and 70(8), which are not related to the
imposition of local working requirements.36 Therefore, one could
reasonably conclude that Article 27(1) is only subject to the
enumerated provisions. A third possible argument against local
working requirements can be made by reference to the
construction of Article 2 of TRIPS, which requires that members
shall not “derogate from existing obligations” agreed under the
WIPO conventions.37 It could thus be argued that obligations
differ from rights (for example, the right to impose compulsory
licenses for the non-working) and that Article 2 merely confirms
the continuation of obligations as opposed to rights.38

34. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2.
35. Id. art. 27.
36. Arguably, the second part of Article 27(1), which contains the
discrimination obligation, is not even subject to the “public health exception” of
Article 27(2). See Berger, supra note 15, at 177.
37. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2.
38. The analysis in the next section yields the answer that rights and
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The three provisions covered thus far form the direct legal
framework applicable on the question of the legality of local
working requirements. Also of relevance are Articles 7, 8, 30,
and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Articles 7 and 8, entitled
“Objectives” and “Principles,” respectively, are relevant from a
treaty interpretation standpoint. Article 30 is a general
exception, which allows limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred under TRIPS. Article 31 of TRIPS regulates
compulsory licensing by setting the conditions, including time
periods and remuneration payable, for patent use that is not
authorized by the patent holder.
B. CONFLICT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The WTO legal order, as with any legal regime, is a system
of norms.39 In order to clarify WTO law, the relevant norms
must be identified and the hierarchy of those norms assessed.
The preceding section began this assessment by querying
whether the term “right” possibly subordinates the allowance or
right of local working requirements contained in the Paris
Convention to the anti-discrimination obligation in the TRIPS
Agreement.
Pauwelyn’s contemporary contribution to the study of the
conflict of norms separates norms into four categories: a
command which obliges states to do something; a prohibition
which is an obligation to not do something; a permission which
grants a right to do something; and an exemption which grants
a right to not do something.40 For our study, the question is
whether the prohibition against discrimination in Article 27 of
TRIPS is reconcilable with the permission to impose local
working requirements in Article 2 of TRIPS (importing the Paris
Convention).
A narrow definition of the term “conflict” would answer this
question in the positive. As seminally propounded by Jenks,
under the narrow definition, a conflict only arises where a state
party “cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under
both treaties.”41 If this definition for “conflict” is used to analyze
the states’ obligations under TRIPS, then there is no conflict

obligations are similarly incorporated and confirmed by Article 2 of TRIPS.
39. See KELSEN, supra note 14, at 123 (“The legal order is a system of norms.”).
40. See PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 158.
41. Wilfred Jenks, Conflict of Law-making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401,
426 (1953) (emphasis added).
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between provisions relevant to the legality of local working
requirements. Article 27, as an obligation, simply trumps any
right to impose local working requirements. The absence of an
irreconcilable conflict42 necessitates the fulfillment of all of the
states’ obligations under TRIPS, including Article 27. The
matter would be closed.
The matter remains open because in the first consideration
of “conflict” in the context of WTO dispute settlement, the panel
in EC—Bananas considered and rejected the avoidance of
conflicts through the subordination of rights to obligations. The
panel stated:
It is true that Members could theoretically comply with [both
provisions], simply by refraining from invoking the right. . . . However,
such an interpretation would render whole Articles or sections of
Agreements redundant and run counter to the object and purpose of
many agreements listed in Annex 1A which were negotiated with the
intent to create rights and obligations which in parts differ
substantially from those of the GATT 1994.43

Ultimately, the panel in EC—Bananas decided to recognize
conflict in both situations: (i) where there are clashes between
obligations that are mutually exclusive, so a member cannot
comply with both obligations simultaneously; and (ii) where a
rule in one agreement prohibits what a rule in another
agreement explicitly permits.44 To the contrary, the second
panel to consider the definition of conflict, Indonesia—Autos,
opted for a narrow construction, stating that “under public
international law a conflict exists in the narrow situation of
mutually exclusive obligations for provisions that cover the
same type of subject matter.”45

42. See Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 69, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998)
(deciding that Argentina’s inability to establish an irreconcilable conflict between
provisions meant that nothing superseded Argentina’s obligations under GATT
1994).
43. Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 3(a)(ii), WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997).
44. See id. ¶ 7.159.
45. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, ¶ 14.49, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998);
see also Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Anti–Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement From Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998). The Appellate
Body Report opined that a case of conflict only existed where provisions could not be
read as complementing each other and that the special or additional provisions are
to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a
provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to
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In balancing the two contradictory panel reports on the
issue of conflict discussed above, it is noteworthy that the
panel’s decision in Indonesia—Autos was not appealed; however,
in EC—Bananas the panel’s decision was reviewed by the
Appellate Body. Although the Appellate Body in EC—Bananas
did not directly consider the panel’s unambiguous statement on
conflict, it upheld the panel’s findings based on the recognition
of a conflict between rights and obligations.46
We also note that the panel in Indonesia—Autos gave its
judgment on the existence of conflict with the proviso that, even
if it were to accept the ruling of the panel in EC—Bananas of a
broad definition of conflict, “there [could be] no conflict because
the SCM Agreement does not ‘explicitly permit’ local content
subsidies.”47 We thus seek to distinguish the panel’s findings in
Indonesia—Autos from direct application to the question of local
working requirements for the reason that the panel in
Indonesia—Autos contemplates a scenario where the broader
definition put forward in EC—Bananas might be correct in
assuming an explicit right were to exist, as one does in Article 2
of TRIPS.48
It is also interesting to note that the panel in Indonesia—
Autos justified its narrow definition by the principle of
“presumption against conflict” (discussed later in this Article).
This presumption has subsequently been applied without
subordinating rights to obligations and applied to specifically
uphold rights in an incorporated WIPO treaty.49 Further, the
Appellate Body has recognized conflict in situations that fall
a violation of the other provision. The impact of this statement on the definition of
conflict, broad or narrow, is uncertain, not least because we are dealing with an
incorporated provision and not an additional or special one. While the idea of
“adherence” is considered by some to limit conflict to situations where two
obligations clash, i.e., a narrow definition of conflict; other commentators find that
the adherence of a provision can extend to rights and obligations, and therefore this
statement does not necessarily espouse a narrow definition of conflict. Compare
Gabrielle Marceau, Conflict of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 35 J. WORLD
TRADE 1081, 1085 (2001) (stating that adherence limits the definition of conflict)
with PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 195 (arguing that adherence extends the
definition of conflict).
46. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 255, WT/DS27/A,B/R (Sep. 9,
1997).
47. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, ¶ 5.345, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998).
48. See id. ¶ 5.346.
49. See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
¶ 6.6, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); see also infra Section 4.1.3.
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beyond the narrow scope of the panel’s definition in Indonesia—
Autos. For example, the Appellate Body in United States—FSC
and Brazil—Aircraft accepted that conflict existed where the
provisions in question provided different obligations that were
not mutually exclusive (mutual exclusivity being a required
element of conflict as per Indonesia—Autos).50
Further support for a broader definition of “conflict” is
found in the authoritative commentary of Sir Humphrey
Waldock, who remarked in the preparation of Article 30 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)51 that “[t]he
idea conveyed by the term [conflict] was that of a comparison
between two treaties which revealed that their clauses . . . could
not be reconciled with one another.”52 The term clause, of
course, encompasses clauses granting rights as well as clauses
placing obligations.
If conflict can exist between a right and an obligation, then
it only follows logically that rights are on par with obligations.
This is by no means a novel idea. For instance, preeminent
jurist Hans Kelsen stated:
[A] distinction is drawn between legal norms which command or
forbid, on the one hand, and legal norms which permit, on the other:
“Law is permissive or imperative.” But the distinction does not hold.
The legal order gives somebody a permission, confers on somebody a
right, only by imposing a duty upon somebody else . . . Law is
imperative for the one, and thereby permissive for the other.53

Interestingly, the Appellate Body in US—Section 211
applied this formulation of rights as imposing corresponding
obligations.54 In that dispute, the rights granted under the Paris
Convention were characterized as obligations on other WTO
members to confer those rights. The Appellate Body held:
WTO Members are obliged to confer an exceptional right on an
applicant in a Paris Union country other than its country of origin, one

50. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporations”, ¶ 117, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000); see also Appellate Body
Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 191, WT/DS46/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999).
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. We elaborate on the applicability of the VCLT to WTO disputes in Part IV.
52. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Remarks at the 742nd
meeting on the Law of Treaties (June, 10 1964) in 1 Y.B.Int’l L. Comm’n 125, ¶ 68
(1966) (emphasis added).
53. See KELSEN, supra note 14, at 77 (emphasis added).
54. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
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that is over and above whatever rights the other country grants to its
own nationals in its domestic law. . . . [I]f [a] country is a Member of
the Paris Union – and, now, of the WTO – then an applicant from
another WTO Member who seeks registration in that country of a
trademark duly registered in its country of origin has the additional
rights that WTO Members are obliged to confer on that applicant under
[the Paris Convention].55

Thus, the rights under the Paris Convention are granted
the status of corresponding obligations on other members. These
rights have taken on the language of obligations, and the
obligations owed under both the TRIPS Agreements and the
incorporated Conventions are on equal footing. This
interpretation was confirmed by the Arbitrators in EC—
Bananas, which explicitly held that when TRIPS incorporates
other instruments, membership in the TRIPS Agreement does
not excuse compliance with one instrument’s obligations at the
expense of another.56
The possibility of a conflicting relationship can be further
explored through the scholarship of Pauwelyn in relation to
conflict of norms in international law. Pauwelyn prescribes
three requirements that must be fulfilled before two norms can
be in conflict: overlap in the subject matter (ratione materiae);
overlap in the state parties to which the norms apply (ratione
personae); and the point-in-time operation of the norms (ratione
temporis).57
The conflict between Article 27 of TRIPS and Article 5 of
the Paris Convention covers all three of these requirements.
They both deal with rights enjoyable under a patent (overlap in
subject matter) and the application of Article 2 of TRIPS makes
their operation simultaneous in cases of non-working a patent
(temporal overlap). The temporal overlap occurs because the
obligation not to discriminate in TRIPS is a general obligation
which applies continuously to regulate conduct, while the rights
granted under the Paris Convention are individual in that they
are triggered in the specific circumstance of abuse by nonworking.58 Thus there is a temporal overlap at the point when
the right under the Paris Convention is triggered.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Decision of the Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 149, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU
(Mar. 24, 2000).
57. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 165.
58. Id. at 160.

292

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

Lastly, with respect to ratione personae, Article 2.1 of
TRIPS clearly states that “[TRIPS] Members shall comply with
Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention.”59
This obligatory language demands compliance with the
incorporated parts of the Paris Convention, including Article 5,
from all TRIPS members. Thus every member of the WTO (and
therefore TRIPS) is bound by both legal provisions: Article 5 of
the Paris Convention and Article 27 of TRIPS. We believe
Article 2.1 is unequivocal in its intent that all WTO members—
whether or not they are in fact members of the Paris
Convention—must comply with the incorporated provisions of
the Paris Convention. Even if the weight of the language in
Article 2.1 does not suffice, the result is likely to remain
unchanged because, as a practical matter, the membership of
the Paris Convention (173 contracting parties)60 largely overlaps
with the membership of TRIPS (i.e., the WTO membership, 153
members).61 Further there are no industrialized nations in the
WTO that have not signed the Paris Convention,62 making it
highly improbable that a country that is not a signatory of the
Paris Convention, but has influential industrial interests in
patents, will bring an action against local working
requirements. The instigators of such a dispute would almost
certainly be countries with significant intellectual property, and
the TRIPS members who are not parties to the Paris Convention
do not fit that bill. Therefore, we can safely assume that a WTO
dispute regarding local working requirements will have the
characteristic of ratione personae.
Based on the analysis above, we are faced with a situation
in which there is likely to be a conflict between the obligation
under Article 27 of TRIPS and the rights granted by Article 5 of
the Paris Convention (as incorporated into TRIPS by Article
2.2). Simply stated, the action permitted by the Paris
Convention is prohibited by TRIPS. This conclusion is subject to
59. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.1 (emphasis added).
60. World
Intellectual
Prop.
Org.
[WIPO],
Contracting
Parties,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2010).
61. World
Trade
Org.
[WTO],
Members
and
Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan.
23, 2010).
62. Compare WIPO, Contracting Parties, supra note 60, with WTO, Members
and Observers, supra note 61. Only the following WTO members are not party to the
Paris Convention: Cape Verde, Brunei, Darussalam, Fiji, Hong Kong (China),
Kuwait, Macao (China), Myanmar, Solomon Islands, and Chinese Taipei.
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a principle of treaty interpretation—the presumption against
conflict—which seeks to find means of interpreting the
potentially conflicting provisions in harmony to give effect to
each provision (discussed below in Part IV.A.3).
It is worth noting that the question of local working
requirements has traditionally been analyzed in terms of the
ability of Articles 30 and 31 to provide relief from the obligations
in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.63 We disagree with this
approach and prefer to analyze it as a possible conflict between
Article 5 of the Paris Convention and Article 27 of TRIPS. Since
local working requirements are clearly and specifically covered
under Article 5 of the Paris Convention, it seems logical to
frame the discussion within the scope of the specific provision
addressing the issue rather than the general exception in Article
30.64 Further, Article 31 cannot be the most appropriate
analytical tool for the purposes of determining legality of local
working requirements because the provisions regulating the
grant of a compulsory license become relevant only once it is
established that the remedy of a compulsory license is allowed
in circumstances of non-working.
C.

UNITED STATES V. BRAZIL: THE ALMOST-SHOWDOWN

Even the shallowest exploration of the access to essential
medicines in developing countries, or challenges to patentholding pharmaceutical companies, reveals high emotions at the
grassroots level and vigorous debate on an academic and
political level. It is therefore slightly surprising that an issue as
significant to access to medicines as the legality of local working
requirements remains unanswered. A WTO complaint
addressing this issue was filed by the United States against
Brazil, but a mutually agreed solution between the governments
resolved the dispute.

63. See generally Champ & Attaran, supra note 21 (discussing the use of
Articles 30 and 31 as exceptions to the obligations of Articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS);
Kevin J. Nowak, Note, Staying Within the Negotiated Framework: Abiding by the
Non-Discrimination Clause in TRIPS Article 27, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 899, 935–41
(2004) (looking at the obligations Article 27 through application of Article 30);
Bjomberg, supra note 22, at 201 (adhering to this traditional position).
64. See Daya Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 721, 758 (2002) (arguing that working requirements
are compatible with the TRIPS agreement through Article 2 which incorporates
Article 5 of the Paris Convention).
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The story begins with the slightly forced connection drawn
between the anti-discrimination obligation contained in Article
27 and the exceptions provisions in Article 30.65 This connection
received notable encouragement from the decision of the WTO
panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents,66 which held that
any compulsory license granted as an Article 30 exception to
Article 27 must comply with the anti-discrimination
requirement in Article 27.67 The decision was not appealed, and
therefore the Appellate Body, which had previously supported a
broad interpretation of exceptions, did not have occasion to
weigh in on the issue.68 Since the debate over the legality of
local working requirements has traditionally been framed in
terms of the relationship between the obligation in Article 27
and the exceptions to that obligation in Articles 30 and 31, the
Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents decision was significant for
the parties interested in the legality of local working
requirements.
Buoyed by the panel’s narrow reading of the exceptions in
Article 30 in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents, the United
States challenged local working aspects of Brazilian patent
law.69 As expected, the United States’ complaint anticipated

65. Id.
66. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
¶¶ 7.88–.93, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). This dispute did not concern local
working requirements.
67. This aspect of the decision has been criticized in the literature. See, e.g.,
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating:
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 445, 448–54 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 431, 443 (2004) (“[T]he panel was wrong in applying Article 27.1 to
exemptions.”). For an invective condemnation on this and other aspects of the
decision, see Frederick M. Abbot, Bob Hudec as Chair of the Canada—Generic
Pharmaceuticals Panel – The WTO Gets Something Right, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 733,
736 (2003); Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous
Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 493, 505–06 (2000) (calling
the panel’s reasoning on this point “totally perverse” and generally criticizing the
panel’s approach, treaty interpretation, legal interpretations, and conclusions). But
see Nowak, supra note 63 (praising this aspect of the panel’s decision).
68. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 104, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan.
16, 1998) (“[M]erely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by
itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be
warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words,
viewed in context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose, or, in other
words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation.”).
69. The United States formally commenced the legal action in the WTO by a
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that the legality of local working requirements would be based
on Articles 30 and 31 while Brazil’s response relied on Article 5
of the Paris Convention.
Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law,
promulgated on May 14, 1996, in purported compliance with the
new TRIPS regime, requires holders of Brazilian patents to
manufacture the patented product in Brazil (a local working
requirement). Failure to do so could result in a compulsory
license being imposed on the patent after three years unless the
patent holder could demonstrate that production in Brazil was
not economically feasible or was otherwise unreasonable.70
This impugned section of the Brazilian patent law had been
used by the government to establish a successful anti-AIDS
program that offered free antiretroviral medication to patients.
The affordability of the medication was crucial to the
continuation of the program, and the introduction of the law
greatly contributed to a 79% drop in the price of drugs between
1996 and 2000.71
In a storm of anti-AIDS demonstrations, premonitions of a
Pyrrhic victory, and the weight of a looming public-relations
disaster, the United States negotiated a mutually agreeable
solution with Brazil and withdrew its WTO complaint in June
2001.72 Therefore, this perfect candidate for a legal resolution to

communication dated May 30, 2000. The consultations between Brazil and the
United States, joined by the EC, on June 29, 2000 and December 1, 2000 did not
reach a mutually satisfactory outcome and the establishment of a panel was
requested. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
70. See Lei de Propriedade Industrial Brasileira [Brazilian Industrial Property
Law], available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9279.htm; see also ‘t
Hoen, supra note 22, at 32.
71. DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 159 (2004). This
figure, 79%, gives a fair idea of the reasons behind Brazil wanting to defend the
section and similarly the reasons for pharmaceutical companies in the United States
being threatened by it.
72. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19, 2001). Notably, the
Mutually Agreed Solution also included an agreement that Brazil would not launch
dispute settlement action regarding sections 204 and 209 of the United States
patent law; see also Bass, supra note 32, at 208 (noting that the United States
withdrew its complaint); Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 381; Lazzarini, supra
note 15, at 132; Anthony P. Valach Jr., Note, TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent
Holders and Addressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 156, 175–82 (2005); Helen Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint
Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 26, 2001, at A2.
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the local working requirements question never reached its
potential.73 The resolution did not shed any light on the legality
of local working requirements and was considered more of a
temporary laying down of arms rather than surrender. The
nature of the agreement, which merely required Brazil to
provide U.S. officials with advance notice prior to invoking
Article 68 of its patent law, left such provisions open to
challenge in the future.74
As Raustiala notes, the resolution of problems which
drafters leave in the “too hard” basket often falls to the political
stratagem of deferral.75 Like the fate of the United States-Brazil
dispute, deferral may be preferred because a solution through
legal means bears the burden of identifiable losers and winners.
Problematically, the lack of legal certainty leaves countries
hesitant to take advantage of available flexibilities for fear of an
expensive legal challenge.76 Therefore, though not immediately
identifiable, there are still losers in this unresolved legal issue.
IV. TREATY INTERPRETATION—LEGAL SOLUTION TO A
LEGAL PROBLEM
Lack of predictability in legal obligations can have the
practical effect of eroding rights that parties negotiated into the
WTO Agreement. Where textual ambiguity in a treaty
engenders divergent expectations from the membership
regarding their legal rights and obligations, dispute settlement

73. Valach, supra note 72, at 177.
74. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.I (July 19, 2001); see also
Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 381; Valach, supra note 72, at 177.
75. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property
Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2006).
76. For information on the costs of litigating a WTO dispute, see Chad P. Bown,
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and
Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 287, 287–310 (2005); Mark L. Busch & Eric
Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 720–
23 (2003); Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work
for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT’L
CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE
DISPUTE SYSTEM IN THE WTO 1, 5, 16, 29–32 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf. Cf. Ruth L.
Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819 (2003) (discussing generally the difficulties
and problems with WTO dispute resolution).
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presents itself as perhaps the sole means of reaching a
satisfactory solution.
In the context of the WTO, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides
for such interpretations:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.77

The stipulated parameter of customary rules of
interpretation of public international law must be respected by
panels and the Appellate Body if WTO dispute settlement is to
deliver on this promise of providing and maintaining security
and predictability.78 Therefore the discipline of legal
interpretation—as distinguished from judicial activism or
judicial lawmaking—is crucial to any benefit that can be
attributed to the WTO DSB, or any dispute settlement
mechanism for that matter, domestic or international.79 Legal
interpretation and decision-making based upon objectivelybased rules takes on a particularly significant role in the
international sphere where agreements come into being after
painstaking negotiation between the sovereign states party to

77. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, art. III(2), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The applicability of the DSU
mechanism to TRIPS related disputes was confirmed in Appellate Body Report,
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶
29, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
78. See generally Wolfgang Weiss, Security and Predictability Under WTO Law,
2 WORLD TRADE REV. 183 (2003) (discussing why the WTO should respect customary
international legal interpretation).
79. See YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 17 n.3 (2005). The
scope of the WTO DSB’s actions under Article 3.2 has been limited to a point where
the interpretation or clarification does not add or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements. See also Appellate Body Report,
United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (“Given the explicit aim of dispute
settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU
is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying
existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a
particular dispute.”); Lennard, supra note 11, at 85–89 (stating that the best
approach for the WTO DSB is to use the textual approach of the Vienna
Convention).
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the dispute. In that sense, parties to an international dispute
(i.e., nation states) are much more connected to the body of law
governing their dispute (i.e., treaties that they themselves have
negotiated) than most individual citizens before a domestic
court.
A. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
Articles 3180 and 3281 of the VCLT require that a treaty be
interpreted in good faith, according to the purpose, object, and
context of the treaty, with resort to supplementary means of
interpretation (including negotiating history) only if the
preliminary interpretation results in ambiguity or absurdity.82
80.

Article 31 General rule of interpretation:

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, art. 31.
81. Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31,
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article
31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id. art. 32.
82. For this reason, while the negotiating history of local working requirements
as they relate to local production is interesting, it does not feature as part of treaty
interpretation as guided by Article 31 of the VCLT. Negotiating history would only
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In US—Reformulated Gasoline, the first report of the newly
established WTO Appellate Body, the Appellate Body made a
timely proclamation that, for the purposes of the interpretation
of WTO Agreements: “[Article 31 of the VCLT] has attained the
status of a rule of customary or general international law.”83 Not
long after inducting Article 31 into the interpretation tool-kit,
the Appellate Body in Japan—Alcohol announced that “[Article
32 of the VCLT], dealing with the role of supplementary means
of interpretation, [has] also attained the same status [of
customary or general international law].”84
Thus, the Appellate Body has appointed another
international agreement, the VCLT, to play the part of the
“customary rules of interpretation of public international law”
that guide their decisions.85 In doing so, the Appellate Body has
sought to ensure that the WTO’s treaty interpreters remain
subject to “certain common disciplines [imposed] upon treaty
interpreters, irrespective of the content of the treaty provision
being examined and irrespective of the field of international law
concerned.”86
In irony we note that behind an appearance of simplicity,87
these articles raise several questions in their interpretive
guidance. How is an interpreter to be sure that they have
satisfied the requirement of interpretation in good faith? Would
a reading of the TRIPS Agreement that read down the
obligation contained in Article 27 in light of the right to local
working right in Article 5 of the Paris Convention (incorporated
in TRIPS) be in good faith? Is the ordinary meaning of a term its
dictionary meaning? What exact role does the context play in

become relevant under Article 32 of the VCLT if the interpretation according to
Article 31 “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id. Certain criticisms of the Canada—
Pharmaceutical Patents decision focus on panel’s misapplication of Article 31 of the
VCLT in the context of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement in resorting to
negotiating history over the obligatory interpretive sources under Article 31 of the
VCLT. See Howse, supra note 67.
83. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 15, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
84. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 9,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
85. For recent affirmations, see Appellate Body Report, United States—
Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 267,
WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009); Bacchus, supra note 6, at 504–05.
86. Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 60, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001).
87. Frankel, supra note 33, at 386.
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the interpretation of a provision? Does the interpretation have
to be in compliance with the object and purpose provisions of the
treaty in order to be valid under the VCLT?
Before working through these issues, it may be useful to
identify the elements of the VCLT that are relevant in the
context of local working requirements. We noted in Part III.A
that Articles 2 (incorporating Article 5 of the Paris Convention),
27, 30, and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are the main provisions
at issue. In addition, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement
provide the object and purpose of the Agreement.88 The
Preamble is also relevant, as it forms part of the “context” of a
treaty provision as an element mentioned in VCLT Article
31(2).89
Lastly, the Doha Declaration is relevant as an “instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.”90
A Textual Interpretation
For some time, the exact role of elements such as the
context and object and purpose of agreements, which take us
beyond the actual textual language of a provision, was not
immediately clear to the GATT/WTO legal community. We know
from the VCLT that these elements are relevant, but are they
determinative, and if not, then to what extent are they
influential? This question formed the crux of the debate
surrounding the conclusion of the VCLT in 1969.
When the mode of interpretation of treaties was enveloped
in doctrinal controversy at the 1968 Vienna Conference,
attendees considered three main approaches.91 The first used
the text of the relevant provisions as a mere starting point, and
sought to determine the appropriate interpretation based on the
intentions of the parties. The second was a textual method
where an investigation into the intent of the parties at the time
of drafting was only relevant to the extent that it was captured

88. In addition to purpose, Mitchell and Voon suggested that Articles 7 and 8
could also serve as context in interpreting other TRIPS provisions. See Andrew D.
Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond:
Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571, 573 (2009).
89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, art. 31.
90. Id.
91. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 20.
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by the text of an agreement. The third was the teleological
method, which began with a broad consideration of the treaty’s
object and purpose and then interpreted the relevant provisions
in a manner that was best suited to the fulfillment of the object
and purpose.92
It is now beyond doubt that treaty interpretation under the
VCLT must follow the textual approach, as confirmed by the
WTO Appellate Body and the International Law Commission.93
Therefore, dispute settlement proceeds on the basis that the
intentions and expectations of the parties appear in the text of
the agreement94 and adjudicators are not at liberty to read into
the text any intention that is not apparent from the text of the
relevant provision. In the words of former chairman of the
Appellate Body James Bacchus, “the ‘deal’ is in the words of the
treaty.”95
This choice of the textual or predominantly literal approach
has been justified by reference to the security and predictability
that it offers.96 However, the task of the treaty interpreter is
92. See id. at 20 n.90. See also Summary Records of the 876th Meeting, [1966] 1
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 130–35 (2d ed. 1984); Gerald Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation
and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1951); Francis G. Jacobs,
Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 319–25 (1969) (laying out the three different approaches to
treaty interpretation).
93. See Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 17, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (“[T]he words actually used in the
Article provide the basis for an interpretation that must give meaning and effect to
all its terms. The proper interpretation of the Article is, first of all, a textual
interpretation.”); Summary Records of the 876th Meeting, supra note 92. For
comments by participants in the Vienna Convention, see Sir Humphrey Waldock,
Third Report on the Law of the Treaties, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 5, 56, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/167; SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 115.
94. See Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 43–45, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
95. Bacchus, supra note 6, at 512.
96. See Jacques Werner, The TRIPS Agreement Under the Scrutiny of the WTO
Dispute Settlement System: The Case of Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products in India, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 309, 319 (1998)
(“Any extension of the TRIPS’ textual obligations through interpretation might
cause these countries to consider that the delicate, negotiated equilibrium which
they had achieved in the WTO Agreement is being altered in favour of the developed
countries, which of course might alter their goodwill in honouring their obligations.
The Appellate Body’s determination not to allow any alteration of the negotiated
equilibrium of the TRIPS Agreement transpires throughout its opinion.”); see also
Olivier Cattaneo, The Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement: Considerations for the
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complicated by the fact that influences of the teleological
approach remain in Article 31 of the VCLT. Supported by
eminent international law figures such as Sir Henry
Lauterpacht, the teleological approach to interpretation appears
in the VCLT requirement that a good faith interpretation of a
treaty can only occur in “light of its object and purpose.”97
Initially the Appellate Body struggled to reconcile this
teleological trait with its textual interpretation agenda, and
resorted to addressing the elements required by Article 31 of the
VCLT in a hierarchical manner.98
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the
particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting
that provision, read in their context, that the object and the purpose of
the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the
meaning imparted by text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where
confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is
desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may
usefully be sought.99

Thus in this early case, the Appellate Body introduced a
kind of sequencing for the contextual aspects of Article 31 of the
VCLT that resembled the use of supplementary materials in
Article 32 of the VCLT.100 Under this approach the use of object
and purpose would be reserved for situations where the text was
equivocal. Shanker notes, and we agree, that absent any words
in Article 31 of the VCLT requiring this type of hierarchy
between elements of interpretation, there is no reason for such
dilution of the role of the object and purpose of a treaty.101 The
WTO Panel and Appellate Body, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 627, 657–58 (2000);
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court:” Some
Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 616 (2002).
97. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 21 n.12; see also Jacobs, supra note 92, at
320 n.3.
98. See
Appellate
Body
Report,
European
Communities—Customs
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R
(Sept. 12, 2005); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005); Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in
US—Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 120 (2006) (discussing the
friction between the textual and holistic approaches).
99. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (emphasis
added).
100. See Shanker, supra note 64, at 726.
101. Id. See also Ehlermann, supra note 96, at 615–16 (“According to Article
31.1 of the Vienna Convention, ‘a Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
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Appellate Body in US—Zeroing recently agreed with this
reasoning and endorsed a holistic and integrated approach to
the interpretive elements in Article 31 of the VCLT. It is worth
setting out in full the Appellate Body’s unambiguous
pronouncement in US—Zeroing, as it clearly answers questions
that would otherwise require discussion:
The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32
are to be followed in a holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is
engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious and
coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render
the treaty provision legally effective. . . . [A] treaty interpreter is
required to have recourse to context and object and purpose to elucidate
the relevant meaning of the word or term. . . . This logical progression
provides a framework for proper interpretative analysis . . . . At the
same time, it should be kept in mind that treaty interpretation is an
integrated operation, where interpretative rules or principles must be
understood and applied as connected and mutually reinforcing
components of a holistic exercise. . . . [R]ules and principles of the
Vienna Convention cannot contemplate interpretations with mutually
contradictory results. Instead, the enterprise of interpretation is
intended to ascertain the proper meaning of a provision; one that fits
harmoniously with the terms, context, and object and purpose of the
treaty. The purpose of such an exercise is therefore to narrow the range
of interpretations, not to generate conflicting, competing
interpretations. Interpretative tools cannot be applied selectively or in
isolation from one another. It would be a subversion of the
interpretative disciplines of the Vienna Convention if application of
those disciplines yielded contradiction instead of coherence and
harmony among, and effect to, all relevant treaty provisions.102

Although the desire to adopt a holistic approach under the
VCLT is not novel, the above-extracted decision of the Appellate
Body clarifies the exact objective of the enterprise of
interpretation: one interpretation which is at harmony with the
entire treaty. This can be reconciled with the victory of

accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Among these three criteria, the
Appellate Body has certainly attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e., ‘the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty’. This is easily illustrated by the
frequent references in Appellate Body reports to dictionaries, in particular to the
Shorter Oxford Dictionary, which, in the words of certain critical observers, has
become “one of the covered agreements”. The second criterion, i.e., “context” has less
weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and relied upon than the
third, i.e., ‘object and purpose’ . . . the Appellate Body clearly privileges ‘literal’
interpretation . . . .”).
102. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶¶ 268–73, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009)
(emphasis added).
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textualism over teleological interpretation because the common
intention of parties is still sought from the text of the treaty—
not predominantly sought from the object and purpose clause
(as would be the teleological approach), nor just the single
clause of the relevant provision (strict textualism), but rather an
interpretation that integrates all of the contextual elements set
out in VCLT Article 31.
Even though our analysis below deals with each of the
interpretive elements of the VCLT (good faith, ordinary
meaning, context, and object and purpose) separately, we
acknowledge that the Appellate Body has moved away from
treating the various interpretive elements as a “sequence of
separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order,”103 and now
seeks a conclusion that boasts harmony with all requisite
elements.
1. Ordinary Meaning of Words in their Context
The legality of local working requirements is probably not
going to turn on the pure meaning attributed to the words in the
relevant provisions of TRIPS or the Paris Convention. This is
unlike disputes such as US—Gambling, where a key issue
before the Appellate Body was whether the ordinary meaning of
“sporting” included gambling, or EC—Chicken Cuts, where the
meaning given to the word “salted” was relevant.104 On the
other hand, the context which informs the ordinary meaning of
the words is bound to be of interest. We make these statements
based on the nature of the complaint by the United States in the
request for consultations with Brazil discussed in Part III.C
above. The political resolution may have deprived us of a legal
solution, but the instigation of the complaint did reveal the
parameters of the problem.
For the sake of completeness we nevertheless “start the
interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the
relevant treaty provision [Article 27 of TRIPS], and then seek to
construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty’s object

103. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶
7.22, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
104. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 170, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12,
2005); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 163, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
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and purpose.”105 Article 27, which promises to be the focus of
any complaint against local working requirements, states that
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”106
The term discrimination is of interest, as it encapsulates
the essence of the obligation in question. A dictionary meaning
can really only serve as a starting point because the Appellate
Body has made the well-founded point in US—Gambling that
dictionaries “aim to catalogue all meanings of words—be those
meanings common or rare, universal or specialized.”107
Therefore, anything more than an initial consideration of the
dictionary meaning would be ineffectual in establishing the one
meaning of the text which articulates the common intention of
the parties.108 In allocating a meaning which is in tune with the
common intention of the parties, the context of the words takes
on a prominent role.
We note that the panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical Patents
considered the meaning of “discrimination” in Article 27 for the

105. United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.22.,
WT/DS152/R.
106. TRIPS supra note 5, art. 27.
107. United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, ¶ 164, WT/DS285/AB/R (emphasis added). For a definition of
discrimination, see 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed., 1989) (“1.a. The
action of discriminating; the perceiving, noting, or making a distinction or difference
between things; a distinction (made with the mind, or in action). . . . 1.c. The making
of distinctions prejudicial to people of a different race or colour from oneself . . . . 3.
The faculty of discriminating; the power of observing differences accurately, or of
making exact distinctions . . . .”). For a critique of dictionary use, see Appellate Body
Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 59, WT/DS257/AB/R, (Jan. 19, 2004);
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 92, WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate
Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 153,
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
108. See European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts, ¶ 175 WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (“The ordinary meaning of a
treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each
case. Importantly, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be seen in the light of
the intention of the parties ‘as expressed in the words used by them against the light
of the surrounding circumstances.’” (citing LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365
(1961)); Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act Of 2000, ¶ 248, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003)
(“[D]ictionaries are important guides to, not dispositive statements of, definitions of
words appearing in agreements and legal documents.”).
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purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, with the panel’s
interpretation of the term seemingly agreeing with context being
a benchmark. More specifically, as set out below, the panel
seems to view the discovery of the meaning of discrimination as
a relative task, taking guidance from the context of the whole
agreement to settle on an acceptable explanation:
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as
the national treatment and most-favoured-nation provisions of Articles
3 and 4, do not use the term “discrimination”. They speak in more
precise terms. The ordinary meaning of the word “discriminate” is
potentially broader than these more specific definitions. It certainly
extends beyond the concept of differential treatment. It is a normative
term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the unjustified
imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment. Discrimination
may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called “de
jure discrimination”, but it may also arise from ostensibly identical
treatment which, due to differences in circumstances, produces
differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes called “de facto
discrimination”. . . . ”Discrimination” is a term to be avoided whenever
more precise standards are available, and, when employed, it is a term
to be interpreted with caution, and with care to add no more precision
than the concept contains.109

Even though the Appellate Body did not have the
opportunity to weigh in on the issue, it is reasonable to assume
that the ordinary meaning of the term “discrimination” consists
of two elements: differential treatment and unjustified
disadvantage.110 This is in line with the thrust of Article 27 and
the TRIPS Agreement in general: safeguarding the availability
of patents regardless of national boundaries.
It is as yet not entirely clear, based on this limited analysis
of Article 27, that the grant of a compulsory license for non-work
of a patent satisfies the ordinary meaning of discrimination.
There may be differential treatment for patent holders who do
not produce in the country that granted the patent, but does the
109. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶
7.94, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (emphasis added).
110. Although several commentators sharply criticize the panel for its
application of discrimination to Article 30 exceptions, the two-tiered meaning of
discrimination suggested by the panel whereby it is differentiation with an element
of unjustified discrimination has not been subject to criticism. See generally
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss Diversifying Without Discrimination, supra note 67; Howse,
supra note 67 (criticizing the interpretation of “discrimination” while supporting a
more nuanced approach). In our opinion, the ordinary meaning of discrimination
suggested by the panel is acceptable; however, it is our belief that the panel failed to
properly analyze the issues under the VCLT and incorrectly imposed the
discrimination obligation on the exceptions in Article 30 and 31.
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treatment qualify as unjustified discrimination?
The nature of any obligation beneath the word can only be
determined if the ordinary meaning above tests its mettle
against the context of the words and in line with the object and
purpose of the agreement between parties. We reiterate at this
point that this is necessary to achieve the requisite holistic
interpretation of the agreement discussed above. Therefore,
having come to an ordinary meaning of the relevant provision,
we now seek agreement as to the meaning from the context.
Context
The arguments against local working requirements are held
in place by the strength of the obligation in Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement. This article is sought to be enforced as an
absolute bar against acts by a member of TRIPS that
discriminate on the basis of, among other things, whether
products are imported or locally produced. But is there such a
thing as an absolute clause?111
The history of treaty interpretation under the VCLT and
the Appellate Body gives a clear negative answer to this
proposition, in favor of an interpretation in line with the treaty
as a whole.112 For instance, the panel in Canada—
Pharmaceutical Patents answered this question specifically in
the context of Article 27:
[T]he context to which the Panel may have recourse for purposes of
interpretation of specific TRIPS provisions, in this case Articles 27 and
28, is not restricted to the text, Preamble and Annexes of the TRIPS
Agreement itself, but also includes the provisions of the international
instruments on intellectual property incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, as well as any agreement between the parties relating to
these agreements within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.113

111. See Champ & Attaran, supra note 20, at 368.
112. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (“The
interpretative exercise is engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious
and coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole . . . . “). See also Appellate
Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, ¶ 151,
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008) (stating that
the context includes all of the text of the treaty (i.e., the WTO Agreement) and is
relevant for a treaty interpreter to the extent that it may shed light on the
interpretative issue to be resolved, such as the meaning of the term or phrase at
issue).
113. Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.14,

308

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

Even though the panel used permissive language such as
“may have recourse to” above, the Appellate Body has recently
stated that “a treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to
context and object and purpose to elucidate the relevant
meaning of the word or term.”114 Accordingly, we must include
in our ordinary meaning of Article 27 consideration of a key
provision of TRIPS in any dispute regarding local working
requirements: Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement, which enlivens
the obligations owed by a state under the Paris Convention.115
As we have already established above, Article 2 brings Article
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention into the fold. Moreover, it must
be remembered that the Appellate Body has extended the nonderogation of the Paris Convention obligations as per Article 2 of
the TRIPS Agreement to rights granted under the Paris
Convention.116
This incorporation of most of the substantive parts of the
Paris Convention into the TRIPS Agreement via Article 2 also
addresses the issue of the two agreements being distinct
agreements. As there is no hierarchy of norms in international
law, the incompatibility of treaties is usually resolved, in line
with the contractual freedom of states, by established rules of
international law such as lex specialis derogat legi generali (the
special prevails over general legislation) or lex posterior legi
priori (later legislation supersedes earlier legislation).117
In our case the later timing of the TRIPS Agreement, or the
specificity of the Paris Convention,118 cannot be determinative
because the two principles mentioned above (lex specialis and
lex posterior) are resigned to the position of residuary rules,
which take a backseat to the terms of the treaty—more
specifically the terms of the treaty that define the relationship
WT/DS114/R.
114. United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (emphasis added). This is compatible with the
use of the word “shall” in Article 31(1) and (2) of the VCLT.
115. TRIPS supra note 5, art. 2.
116. Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
117. Weiss, supra note 78, at 204. See PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 96
(discussing that a later statement must logically prevail over the prior). These rules
find codification in Article 30 of the VCLT, which has not been formally inducted
into the applicable rules of customary law for WTO dispute settlement. Panels and
the Appellate Body, however, have not hesitated in referring to them when they
have become relevant.
118. Arguably, the Paris Convention deals specifically with patents whereas
TRIPS deals with intellectual property in general.
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between instruments (i.e., Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement).
Ian Sinclair’s authoritative writings on the Vienna Convention,
and treaty interpretation in general, clarify this point:
[I]t is clear that the rules laid down in [VCLT] Article 30 are intended
to be residuary rules – that is to say, rules which will operate in the
absence of express treaty provisions regulating priority. . . . Sir
Humphrey Waldock [has] confirmed ‘that the rules in paragraphs 3, 4
and 5 were thus designed essentially as residuary rules’.119

The panel in India—Pharmaceuticals referred to Sinclair’s
pronouncement in confirming that for the purposes of the WTO
DSB, “If the treaty provides for the relationship between the
two ‘conflicting’ rules, the principle [lex specialis] no longer
applies.”120 In that case, since a footnote to the 1994
Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions provided for
the application of the DSU to balance-of-payments matters, the
residuary rules of treaty interpretation could not be called upon
to resolve any conflict.121
The TRIPS Agreement also makes such a provision for the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the
incorporated Paris Convention. Article 2 of TRIPS explicitly
imposes those older obligations on the future actions of the
parties under the TRIPS Agreement: “Nothing in Parts I to IV of
this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that
Members may have to each other under the Paris
Convention . . . .”122
Therefore, we include, in our consideration of the scope of
the obligation in Article 27, the provision in Article 5 of the
Paris Convention as a non-derogable obligation imposed on each
state party other than the one who exercises “the right to take
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for
example, failure to work.”123 It is not insignificant that members
119. SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 97.
120. Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 4.20, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999). In that dispute
the panel was only concerned with the lex specialis principle, but with the
pronouncement by Sinclair that the panel relied upon covered lex posterior as well, it
can be presumed that the residual characteristic applies to the lex posterior principle
as well.
121. Id.
122. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.
123. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(A). See supra Part III.B for the
“right” of one member being construed as an obligation on the other TRIPS members
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decided to actively incorporate this Paris Convention remedy
against abuse of patents into the TRIPS Agreement. As we will
discuss below, not only is this inclusion important from a
contextual perspective, but members also reinforced their
distaste for abuse in the object and purpose of TRIPS.
The preamble to TRIPS, included as context by Article 31(2)
of the VCLT, further encourages an element of compromise in
the construction of obligations in the Agreement. The
significance attached to preamble language by the Appellate
Body takes root in the opinion that the preamble is an
indication of intention visible in the text of an Agreement: “[As]
preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the
WTO Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and
shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the
WTO Agreement . . . .”124
In the preamble to TRIPS, members preface the agreement
to the terms of TRIPS with several points disclosing the vision
parties had for the rights and obligations to follow. Relevantly,
in coming to an agreement, members “took into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights”; recognized “the underlying public policy
objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual
property, including developmental and technological objectives”;
and articulated a desire to “establish a mutually supportive
relationship between the WTO and World Intellectual Property
Organization.”125
In light of these words, it is difficult to reason that such an
interpretation of the obligation in Article 27 be adopted which
ignores a WIPO right explicitly incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement and reduces the public policy space for a member
country (most likely a developing country) to implement an
intellectual property regime that balances its obligations under
the WTO structure with its developmental and technological
needs. Local working requirements, as discussed above, are
rationalized as a tool available to states to mitigate the
demands of intellectual property laws on public interests, which

to grant that right when it is exercised. Appellate Body Report, United States—
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2 2002).
124. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 153, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). See also Panel
Report, Egypt—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar From Turkey, ¶
7.154, WT/DS211/R (Aug. 8, 2002).
125. TRIPS, supra note 5, pmbl.
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as the TRIPS preamble recognizes are private rights.
The Doha Declaration
Under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, the treaty interpreter is
also required to consider any agreement or instrument relating
to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty. We propose that
the Doha Declaration is at the very least an instrument which
provides the relevant context influencing any reading of Article
27.126 Adopted during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar
in November 2001, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health addressed the impact that the international
intellectual property regime was having on the public health of
several member states.
The membership of the WTO thus declared that the TRIPS
Agreement “can and should be interpreted and implemented in
a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.”127 Further, it reinforced the public space available to
members suffering a public health crisis and reinforced some of
the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement (such as the
granting of compulsory licenses).
The question then becomes whether the Declaration, made
four months after the United States and Brazil mutually agreed
to a solution to the United States complaint against local
working requirements in Brazilian patent law, would make a
difference if it was made before the complaint was brought to
the WTO. More specifically, how would a WTO panel or the
Appellate Body now respond, with the Doha Declaration in the
background, to a public health related complaint (such as one
challenging the validity of working requirements) filed under
the TRIPS Agreement?
The answer is at present uncertain. Without a doubt, the
Doha Declaration remains a diplomatic victory for the
developing world. However, the legal weight of the Doha
Declaration is unclear. Some members, notably the United
States, believe that the Declaration has no legal authority

126. See Lucyk, supra note 7, at 196–99 (describing the importance of the Doha
Declaration and the ways in which a WTO body may use it).
127. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 4, Nov. 14,
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755.
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because it is a merely a diplomatic step.128 Academic
commentary is divided, but some see the Doha Declaration as
being of little definitive legal value:
It should be noted that ministerial declarations within the WTO are
not legally binding in the dispute resolution process, and in the event
of a dispute the language of the treaties as approved by national
governments would prevail over any contradictory declaration by the
ministers. But the Doha Declaration is primarily interpretive of
imprecise obligations in TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any
textual provision. As such, it is likely to be persuasive authority in the
interpretation of TRIPS in the event of a dispute.129

Arguably, however, the Doha Declaration is more than
merely persuasive and would affect the way a panel or the
Appellate Body decides such a case.130 We support the view that
while the Declaration is not technically an authoritative
interpretation under Article IX(2) of the Marrakesh
Agreement,131 it has the look and effect of an authoritative
interpretation.132 Moreover, the Doha Declaration was delivered
128. USTR Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from WTO Doha Meeting, (Nov. 15,
2001), http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_11/alia/a1111516.htm (describing the
TRIPS declaration as a “political declaration”).
129. Sykes, supra note 4, at 54.
130. See Valach, supra note 72, at 157 (describing the importance placed on the
issue by the members of the WTO, and the subsequent weight of the declaration).
131. DSU, supra note 77, art. IX(2) (establishing procedure for adoption of
authoritative interpretations of the agreement).
132. For further discussion, see World Health Org., Implications of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3
(June, 2002) (prepared by Carlos M. Correa)
[G]iven the content and mode of approval of the Doha Declaration, it can be
argued that it has the same effects as an authoritative interpretation. In
particular, in providing an agreed understanding on certain aspects of the
TRIPS Agreement in paragraph 5, Members have created a binding
precedent for future panels and Appellate Body reports.
Id. See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative
Interpretation Under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L.
803, 816–17 (2005) (“[A]n authoritative interpretation would not have been suitable,
given that this Declaration contained statements of a political nature, confirmed (or
even merely referred to) existing provisions, and gave a mandate for legislative
action.”). However, for an argument supporting the position that the Declaration is
an interpretation under Article IX(2), see HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 279–82 (2007). For
more detailed discussion on the legal status of the Doha Declaration, see Gathii,
supra note 128. To date, no panel or Appellate Body has had the opportunity to
discuss the status of the Doha Declaration; however, previous panels and the
Appellate Body have confirmed the exclusive ability of the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council to adopt interpretations. See Appellate Body Report, United
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by the body with the exclusive authority to issue such
interpretations. There are also arguments supporting the view
that the Doha Declaration was “intended as a binding waiver
[paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement]
of certain TRIPS obligations. . . .”133
Even if the Declaration is to be viewed merely as a
diplomatic statement carrying no legal weight, the Appellate
Body would undoubtedly find it necessary to consider and
discuss the impact of the Declaration. Moreover, even if such
discussion is limited to the Declaration forming part of the
context in which the obligation against discrimination exists, it
demonstrates that Article 27 exists as a mere part of an
agreement that is balanced by enforceable flexibility.
The obligation in Article 27 operates in an environment
where the other provisions of the treaty, the preamble of the
treaty, and an instrument completed in relation to the treaty all
indicate that the operation of any provision must be
sympathetic to the kind of concerns addressed by local working
requirements. When viewed in totality, it becomes difficult to
conclude that the differential treatment resulting from local
working requirements amounts to an unjustified disadvantage
(this is especially the case when non-work of a patent has
significant public health consequences).
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the
ordinary meaning of the term “discrimination,” in context, casts
serious doubt on the proposition that local working
requirements breach Article 27. Although the imposition of local
working requirements may result in differential treatment, the
context of Article 27 precludes a finding of unjustified
discrimination.
We now proceed to the impact that the object and purpose of
an agreement can have on a WTO panel or Appellate Body’s
interpretation.

States—Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India,
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) at 17-20; Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)
at 12-15.
133. Mitchell and Voon, supra note 88, at 581. The Marrakesh Agreement
states, “In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to
waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . .” DSU supra note 77, art. IX(3).
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Object and Purpose

Earlier in Part IV.A, we looked at the complication that this
element of the teleological interpretation brought to the
decision-makers in the WTO. We now know that, uneasy or not,
a compromise must be reached between the textualism
demanded from a treaty interpreter and the “object and
purpose” as necessary considerations in interpretation.134 This
was cemented in the Doha Declaration, which reinforced the
flexibilities available under TRIPS for members seeking to
address public health issues: “In applying the customary rules of
interpretation of public international law, each provision of the
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.”135
These objectives and principles are as follows:
TRIPS Article 7 Objectives:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
and obligations.
TRIPS Article 8 Principles:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.136

It is worth mentioning that the Appellate Body has held
that in an interpretation under the VCLT, the object and
134. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (“[A]
treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to context and object and purpose to
elucidate the relevant meaning of the word or term.”).
135. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note
127, ¶ 5(a).
136. TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 7–8.
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purpose to be considered is that of the entire treaty and not just
the object and purpose of a particular provision:137
[W]e caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the
purported “object and purpose” of specific provisions, paragraphs or
subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff headings in
Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the
whole. Even if, arguendo, one could rely on the specific “object and
purpose” of heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we would
share the Panel’s view that “one Member’s unilateral object and
purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot form the
basis” for an interpretation of that commitment, because
interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the
parties.138

This interpretation further underpins the dismissal of the
idea that a provision in TRIPS or another WTO agreement can
be absolute or untempered by its context.
The question of how the treaty interpreter is expected to
maintain an allegiance to the textual approach of interpretation
while necessarily considering the teleological element of object
and purpose must now be addressed. As discussed earlier, it is
not an exercise in ticking boxes in order to reach a validly
considered interpretation. Rather it is an exercise in holistic
interpretation to give effect to the requirement regarding object
and purpose. We therefore start with the ordinary meaning in
context. Once this meaning is understood, the interpreter must
connect that meaning to the case at hand in order to reach the
conclusion. The role of the object and purpose is the third point
of reference which proves the conclusion. This secondary nature
of object and purpose clears the way for a complete, and yet
textual, analysis in treaty interpretation.139

137. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 239, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12,
2005).
138. Id.
139. Sinclair, who participated in the Vienna Conference where the VCLT was
finalized, noted:
[T]he object and purpose of the treaty is, as it were, a secondary or
ancillary process in the application of the general rule on interpretation.
The initial search is for the ‘ordinary meaning’ to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their ‘context’; it is in the light of the object and purpose of the
treaty that the initial and preliminary conclusion must be tested and either
confirmed or modified. . . . A number of authors consider that the search for
the object and purpose of a treaty is in reality a search for the common
intentions of the parties who drew up the treaty. This approach has certain
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We now return to the original meaning, in context, viewed
through the prism of object and purpose. We saw above that the
obligation against discrimination in Article 27 exists in the
context of a right to grant compulsory licenses in cases where
the patent was abused by non-work; preambular support for
cooperation between WIPO and WTO; and, particularly for
patents on pharmaceuticals, the Doha Declaration which allows
member states to interpret TRIPS to promote access to
medicine, particularly through compulsory licensing. Therefore
the second limb of the discrimination obligation in Article 27,
unjustified disadvantage, becomes relevant. It demands more
than the differential treatment (the first limb of the
discrimination obligation) that results from local working
requirements. Having examined the ordinary meaning in
context, the conclusion we reach is that such unjustified
disadvantage is difficult to find in circumstances where states
call upon local working requirements. Put simply, the context
justifies the treatment.
Our conclusion is supported by the objectives and principles
of the TRIPS Agreement, as articulated in Articles 7 and 8. The
objectives seek a balance between the intellectual property
rights and obligations, and particularly mention the objective of
intellectual property rights to promote “technological innovation
and the transfer and dissemination of technology.”140 This
summarizes the rationale of local working requirements. The
principles of TRIPS, equivalent to the purpose of the agreement,
voice flexibility for members seeking to protect public health
and nutrition and promoting technological development. Such
flexibility for the protection of public health echoes key concerns
of countries seeking to utilize local working requirements.
A balance is required under the ordinary meaning in
context, in line with the object and purpose. Allowing the
absolute operation of the obligation under Article 27 will
impinge on the balance that is sought by the TRIPS Agreement
and lead to a conclusion that ignores the context of the provision
and the guidance of object and purpose.141 Such a reading will
dangers. . . . The text is the expression of the intention of the parties; and it
is to that expression of intent that one must first look.
SINCLAIR, supra note 92, at 130–31 (citations omitted).
140. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 8.
141. Commentators have criticized the panel in Canada—Pharmaceutical
Patents for failing to provide sufficient interpretive weight to Articles 7 and 8 of
TRIPS, and instead relying on the negotiating history of the parties. See generally
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therefore subvert the intention of the parties to the agreement
(as articulated in the text of the Agreement).
3. Conflict Avoidance—Good Faith Interpretation
The amorphous requirement of good faith in treaty
interpretation operates with little guidance. This is possibly
indicative of a reluctance in the dispute settlement bodies to
police the open ended phrase.142 However, certain international
rules of interpretation, which are not explicitly included in the
VCLT armory, are used by the dispute settlement bodies to
infuse “good faith” into their deliberation.143 These rules also
play the additional role of providing a basis for compromise and
balance between seemingly conflicting provisions through
conflict avoidance.
As a word of caution before continuing onto the rules of
interpretation that are used in apparent fulfillment of the good
faith requirement, particularly the principle of effectiveness, we
note that those rules have been questioned for the broad
discretion that they impart to judges. The risk of activism and a
teleological reading must be borne when applying these rules
too broadly.144

Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying without Discrimination, supra note 67; Howse,
supra note 67.
142. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
¶ 7.64, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (“It is notoriously difficult, or at least delicate,
to construe the requirement of the Vienna Convention that a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in third party dispute resolution, not least because of the
possible imputation of bad faith to one of the parties. We prefer, thus, to consider
which interpretation suggests ‘better faith’ and to deal only briefly with this element
of interpretation.”); ASIF H. QURESHI, INTERPRETING WTO AGREEMENTS: PROBLEMS
AND PERSPECTIVES 14 (2006).
143. See Lennard, supra note 11, at 55.
144. Id. at 60 (“Ultimately, the goal of ‘effectiveness’ is one to be sought, but one
which will have to be treated with some caution in WTO jurisprudence for an
additional reason; if the principle is given too large a scope it can amount to a broad
teleological approach, reading things into the treaty that lend an air of neatness and
regularity in pursuit of a perceived object and purpose, but do not flow from its
terms and do not represent a good faith, fundamentally textual, interpretation.”)
(citing Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteen
Session, 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n. 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1); Helge
Elisabeth Zeitler, Good Faith in the WTO Jurisprudence – Necessary Balancing
Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 721, 729 (2005)
(noting that effective interpretation allows for potential judicial activism).
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a. Presumption Against Conflict

The presumption against conflict rule is a fairly selfexplanatory rule that merely champions the view that “[i]t
seems reasonable to start from a general presumption against
conflict.”145 In interpreting treaty provisions, the view to be
taken is that unless there is explicit language verifying a
deviation in the new legal norm from the existing one, states do
not simply “change their minds.”146
This presumption has been applied by the panel in US—
Copyright Act, a dispute with facts similar to the question of the
local working requirements to the extent that it involved the
interaction of provisions in TRIPS and a WIPO treaty. We quote
the panel here and note that each of the statements made
regarding the Berne Convention’s place in the multilateral
copyright regime also holds true for the Paris Convention (a
WIPO treaty) and patent law:
In the area of copyright, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement form the overall framework for multilateral protection.
Most WTO Members are also parties to the Berne Convention. We
recall that it is a general principle of interpretation to adopt the
meaning that reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a
conflict between them. Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting the
TRIPS Agreement to mean something different than the Berne
Convention except where this is explicitly provided for. This principle is
in conformity with the public international law presumption against
conflicts, which has been applied by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body in a number of cases.147

From the perspective of this presumption, in good faith, one
might suggest that the panel/Appellate Body should focus on the
absence of an explicit provision allowing for a divergence in
rights or obligations in the newer TRIPS Article 27 from the
existing Paris Convention Article 5. However, TRIPS explicitly
maintains the applicability of the relevant provision of the Paris
Convention. The presumption against conflict thus operates “to
avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to mean something
different than the [Paris] Convention” since there is no explicit

145. Jenks, supra note 41, at 427; see also Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.28, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) (“[I]n public international law there is a
presumption against conflict.”).
146. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 240.
147. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶
6.66, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (emphasis added).
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provision demanding an incompatible reading of the
provisions.148 Analysis of the presumption would then reveal
that the members did not “just change their mind” about the
availability of compulsory licenses for non-work of a patent
when they agreed to the TRIPS Agreement.
Thus a good faith interpretation, in line with the
presumption against conflict, requires us to give due
consideration to the lack of an explicit provision revoking or
altering the right in the Paris Convention that allows local
working requirements. The presumption against conflict
compels the maintenance of that right in Article 5(A)(2) of the
Paris Convention, despite the TRIPS obligation of nondiscrimination in Article 27.149
b. Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

We now move to another general rule of interpretation, the
principle of effectiveness, which the panel in US—Gambling
correlated to the requirement of good faith,150 and the
International Law Commission viewed as the potential
embodiment of good faith in the VCLT.151 This principle seems
148. Id.
149. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19
(“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State . . . in respect
of any case . . . in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.
Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general
prohibition to States . . . and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed
States to do [the act] in certain specific cases.”) (emphasis added).
150. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.49, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 24, 2004) (“The
requirement that a treaty be interpreted in ‘good faith’ can be correlated with the
principle of ‘effective treaty interpretation’,[sic] according to which all terms of a
treaty must be given a meaning.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 271, WT/DS217/AB/R,
WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003); Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act Of 1998, ¶ 338, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002);
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products, ¶ 81, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999); Appellate Body Report,
Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other
Items, ¶¶ 81, 95, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, ¶ 15,
WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages II, 12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
151. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteen
Session, 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n. 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; see also
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, 11 n.21, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (referring to the International Law Commission
Commentary: “When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and
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to be the means for the implementation of the presumption
against conflict; the step to be taken once the treaty interpreter
accepts the responsibility of that presumption. The Appellate
Body in US—Gasoline understood the principle to prescribe
“that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the
terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading
that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a
treaty to redundancy or inutility.”152
The good faith interpretation in line with this principle
would be supported by the move towards a holistic
interpretation (see Part IV.A) as it attempts to avoid conflict
between provisions by preferring the interpretation that gives
effect to all terms of the treaty. In this way, the principle of
effectiveness also acts as a boundary to the presumption against
conflict, i.e., “if a harmonious reading of the two norms is not
feasible within the realm of treaty interpretation, the
presumption must be seen as rebutted and the existence of
conflict acknowledged.”153
This principle provides an interesting perspective for local
working requirements. In the absence of a provision allowing for
an exception from the obligations contained in Article 27, it can
be argued that choosing to honor the right in Article 2
(incorporating Article 5 of the Paris Convention) reduces the
effect granted to an obligation Article 27.
In addressing this argument, we must first consider
whether the discrimination obligation contained in Article 27,
construed through ordinary meaning in context, is offended by
local working requirements. From the discussion above it is
apparent that the TRIPS Agreement contains several
flexibilities that enable members to address public health
issues. As the flexibilities built into the Agreement are no doubt
justified, it is doubtful whether the second limb of the ordinary
meaning of discrimination—unjustified disadvantage—can be
met. This added limb in the construction of the word
discrimination rebuts the argument of redundancy by limiting
the intended operation of Article 27:
On closer analysis, it is not true that Article 27(1) must be set at
the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be
adopted.”).
152. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 21, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
153. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 251.
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naught and reduced to “redundancy or inutility”. . . . [D]iscrimination,
which is prohibited, stands in distinction to differential treatment,
which is not. Rather, discrimination in law ordinarily consists of the
subset of differential treatment that is ‘unjustified’ or arbitrary (i.e. a
difference maintained without relevant reasons).154

We accept that the requirement to interpret the treaty to
satisfy good faith in interpretation does not allow one to ignore
provisions in a treaty. However, strengthening provisions
beyond their intended operation, as is the case for Article 27 and
local working requirements, would subvert the requirement of
good faith under the guise of giving full effect to a particular
provision.
c. In Dubio Mutius
We now briefly discuss the conflict avoidance principle of in
dubio mutius, which is properly characterized as a principle of
supplementary interpretation rather than a principle of good
faith. The place of the supplementary materials, according to
Article 32, is strictly secondary and limited to circumstances
where applying Article 31 of the VCLT yields an interpretation
where terms remain ambiguous or obscure, or the result
reached is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. We do not believe
that the result in the situation of local working requirements
yields such a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, and it is
for this reason that we do not consider a full exploration of
interpretation in line with supplementary means to be
necessary in this paper. However, in dubio mutius is a principle
directly relevant to the local working requirements problem and
is therefore discussed here.
The Appellate Body in EC—Hormones characterized the
principle as follows: “We cannot lightly assume that sovereign
states intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous,
rather than the less burdensome, obligation by mandating

154. Champ & Attaran, supra note 21, at 389. We also note that although there
is no specific provision creating an exception for local working requirements in the
TRIPS Agreement, other than in Article 5A of the Paris Convention, as incorporated
into TRIPS by Article 2, Article 30 TRIPS, titled “Exceptions to Rights Conferred,” is
a general exception. Given the support for local working requirements under the
flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement, Article 30 as a general exception is
likely capable of carving out the right in Article 5A of the Paris Convention as a
“reasonable” reduction in the effect given to Article 27. See, e.g., Panel Report,
Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, (Mar. 17,
2000).
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conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and
recommendations.”155
The public policy space that local working requirements
seek to protect for states is encapsulated as a right in Article 2
(in conjunction with Article 5 of the Paris Convention). Article
27 on the other hand has the opposite intention of placing an
obligation on the state. In line with in dubio mutius, the nature
of the obligation in Article 27, to the extent that there is an
ambiguity, will be read down to prefer the less onerous
interpretation of the treaty. As discussed above, the ordinary
meaning of Article 27 guides one to an interpretation where the
term “discrimination” requires more than mere differential
treatment, it requires something more pejorative.
As confirmed by the process of treaty interpretation above,
this less onerous interpretation also benefits from the in dubio
mutius principle.156 With this confirmation from a principle of
supplementary interpretation, we complete our consideration of
treaty interpretation. It reinforces the outcome achieved from
the analysis of treaty interpretation, primary interpretation in
Article 31 of the VCLT and hints that the sought “solution” to
the problem may be nigh.
B. DOES “THE ONE” EXIST?
The challenge that the Appellate Body has set for
interpreting WTO Agreements is to find the one proper meaning
of the treaty provisions in question—the one meaning which is
at once at harmony with each of the other terms of the treaty,
155. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶ 64 n. 154, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998). The
interpretative principle of in dubio mitius, widely recognized in international law as
a “supplementary means of interpretation,” has been expressed in the following
terms:
The principle of in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in
deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is
ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the
party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial
and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions
upon the parties.
Id.; OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 (Robert. Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. vol. I, 1992).
156. We note here that parties, especially respondents, are likely to treat this
principle with caution given that narrowing obligations for the benefit of a
particular situation may work against their interests in the future when they seek
to enforce a different obligation.
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the context of the provisions, and the object and purpose of the
treaty.157 This removes the possibility of selecting between
several plausible, competing interpretations and instead
requires the interpreter to embark on the search for “the one.”
Our examination of the issues indicates that it is not
possible under a VCLT analysis to interpret local working
requirements as violating the discrimination provision of Article
27 of the TRIPS Agreement. Is it then a possibility that the
rights in Article 2 of TRIPS are superimposed on the obligation
in Article 27? Or is it necessary to accept that the interpretive
conflict avoidance is insufficient to avoid a genuine conflict
between the rights in Article 5(A) Paris Convention and TRIPS
Article 27, in which case “the one” might not exist?
We consider these possibilities because it is important to
remain cognizant of the limits of treaty interpretation in that it
“will not suffice to reconcile clearly irreconcilable
provision . . . [it] may eliminate certain potential conflicts; it
cannot eliminate the problem of conflict.”158 At the same time,
the DSU has been read such that the Appellate Body is not at
liberty to “avoid making a legal judgment by seeking sanctuary
in non liquet.”159
The Appellate Body has noted that treaty interpretation
cannot go beyond or against the clear meaning of provisions in a
treaty; in other words, it cannot extend to creating new rules.160
Pauwelyn states that in order for treaty interpretation to have a
role in coming to a resolution the provisions must be capable of
being interpreted in reference to each other:
[F]or a WTO rule to be interpreted with reference to another, allegedly
conflicting rule the WTO provision must, first of all, include terms that
are broad and ambiguous enough to allow the input of other rules. In
addition, the other rule must say something about what the WTO term
should mean, that is there must be a hook up with the WTO term for
other rule to impart meaning in the process of interpretation. The

157. Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009).
158. Jenks, supra note 41, at 429.
159. Bacchus, supra note 6, at 507.
160. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Measures on Certain
Products from the European Communities, ¶ 92, WT/DS165/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000)
(“Determining what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought to be is not our
responsibility nor the responsibility of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of
the Members of the WTO.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R
(May 23, 1997).
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other rule, must in other words, be relevant to the WTO rule.161

Interestingly, such a hook-up exists in the case of local
working requirements in the form of Article 2.2 of the TRIPS
Agreement. The right of a state to impose local working
requirements
sits
as
a
non-derogable
obligation,162
notwithstanding certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.163
The relationship set out in the TRIPS Agreement (that the
relevant provisions of the Paris Convention are both rights and
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement) removes the escape route
of a genuine conflict unsolvable by treaty interpretation.
Therefore we can search for “the one” through the process of
treaty interpretation followed above.
The process of treaty interpretation leads us to conclude
that as a matter of law Article 27 is not exclusive or inviolate. It
also demonstrates that local working requirements are not
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. This is an important
result, because if local working requirements were deemed to
violate Article 27, it would be incumbent upon the respondent to
prove that an exception existed.164 As it stands, however, the
burden of proof is on the complainant to demonstrate the
illegality of local working requirements.165 In order to do so, the
complainant must demonstrate that the context of the provision
161. PAUWELYN, supra note 33, at 245.
162. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 136, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (“[A]dditional
rights that WTO Members are obliged to confer on that applicant under [the Paris
Convention].”) (emphasis added).
163. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (“Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement
[i.e., including Article 27 TRIPS Agreement] shall derogate from existing obligations
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention . . . .”).
164. See generally SIMON LESTER & BRYAN MERCURIO, WORLD TRADE LAW:
TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 191 (2008) (providing information on burden of
proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings); WorldTradeLaw.net, Case Law
Index,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/wtoindex.htm#burden
(subscription
required) (containing references to all WTO disputes where burden of proof was an
issue); see also Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, ¶ 7.14, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999); Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.57, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999).
165. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United States,
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
¶ 9, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (“WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be
presumed to act in conformity with their WTO obligations. A party claiming that a
Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of proving that
inconsistency.”) (emphasis added). See also Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and
Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement, Who bears the Burden?, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.
227 (1998).
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(particularly the Doha Declaration and the explicitly
incorporated Paris Convention right in favor of local working
requirements), the object and purpose of the agreement and
principles of good faith, are all insufficient in establishing that
the pejorative connotations of discrimination do not apply.
Based on the analysis presented in this Article, it seems
highly unlikely that a complainant can meet this burden; and
thus, “the one” is revealed. The obligation in Article 27 must be
read in conjunction with Article 2.2 (incorporating Article
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention) and the Doha Declaration.
When viewed in totality, it appears the only way in which a
complainant can meet its burden is by applying the term
“discrimination” to a justifiable exercise of an incorporated
right. Such an application would be nonsensical. Thus, “the one”
remains—Article 2.2, in conjunction with Article 5(A)(2) of the
Paris Convention, which now stands without a competing
provision.
V. CONCLUSION
Under Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention, the legality of
working requirements is beyond doubt. The drafters could have
chosen to exclude Article 5(A)(2) for the incorporation provision
of Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Such an exclusion would
have considerably simplified the issue—working requirements
would very likely be deemed to be inconsistent with TRIPS
Article 27, and an analysis under the general exceptions
provision of Article 30 would inevitably be called upon to
provide a solution.
Such an analysis, however, is unnecessary as the drafters
did incorporate Article 5(A)(2) into the TRIPS Agreement. At
this stage, it simply does not matter whether the incorporation
was intentional, a mistake, or the product of oversight.166 The
fact remains that the TRIPS Agreement incorporates two
seemingly contradictory provisions. Given the importance of
working requirements to public health efforts in the developing
world, it is surprising that their legality remains uncertain and
166. The wording of Article 27 was in fact heavily negotiated during the
Uruguay Round, with the pharmaceutical industry requesting but not obtaining a
direct prohibition of local working requirements. The language of the provision,
therefore, is a “purposely vague” compromise (to use Professor Correa’s term) which
allowed both sides to claim victory but ultimately left the true meaning unresolved.
See CORREA, supra note 10.
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in flux almost fifteen years since the advent of the TRIPS
Agreement.
This Article attempts to resolve the confusion through an
analysis of the principles of treaty interpretation that guide the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. In so doing, we
conclude that local working requirements are consistent with
the TRIPS Agreement. This conclusion is reached through a
comprehensive evaluation of the issue under the various
elements of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. When viewed holistically, it becomes clear that the
context of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement taken
together with the subsequently negotiated Doha Declaration,
the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, and the
principles of good faith point to “the one.” Domestic legislation
providing for local working requirements does not unjustifiably
discriminate against other members in violation of Article 27 of
the TRIPS Agreement.

